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Article 
Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to 
Rebuild the Labor Movement 
Ann C. Hodges†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In 1960, the Supreme Court revolutionized arbitration, at 
least in the labor arena, by deciding the Steelworkers Trilogy, 
which encouraged arbitration to resolve labor disputes and di-
rected the courts to abstain from involvement in the merits of 
these disputes.1 The decisions validated a system of self-
government that had evolved in industrial workplaces and af-
firmed the peaceful resolution of labor disputes internally 
through the use of arbitration.2
But now workplace arbitration has taken a different turn. 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court applied a similar deference to 
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.
 Labor arbitration is one of the 
premier achievements of American labor law.  
3
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Professor Hodges is grate-
ful for the valuable research assistance of Casey Ariail, Class of 2014, Univer-
sity of Richmond and Leah Lorenz, Class of 2015, University of Richmond and 
for financial support from the University of Richmond. The Article benefitted 
greatly from the comments of the participants at the Minnesota Law Review 
Symposium on The Future of Labor Law and from discussions with Lynne F. 
Siegel, former General Counsel, Oregon Education Association and Illinois 
Education Association, Martha Houser, Deputy Executive Director and Gen-
eral Counsel, Colorado Education Association, and Jean R. Sternlight UNLV 
Boyd School of Law &Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution. 
The conclusions and any errors herein are the author’s. Copyright © 2014 by 
Ann C. Hodges. 
 The cases involved 
arbitration agreements between businesses of roughly equal 
bargaining power. Businesses, however, seized on the judicial 
 1. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 598–99 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 
363 U.S. 564, 568–69 (1960). 
 2. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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approval of arbitration of statutory claims and began to include 
arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion with employees 
and consumers. These agreements can have several effects. In 
many cases, they deprive the parties of jury trials. They may 
limit discovery and available damages, and shorten limitations 
periods for filing claims. And perhaps most importantly, they 
may limit the ability to bring a class action suit, rendering 
many smaller claims uneconomical. This new revolution in ar-
bitration has the potential to limit employees’ ability to vindi-
cate their statutory rights.  
With their long history of representing employees in arbi-
tration, unions may have an opportunity to step in and provide 
representation for employees in these cases.4 Private attorneys 
who represent employees are rarely attracted to individual ar-
bitration cases because of the often-limited potential for dam-
ages.5 In contrast, union representation in such cases, by either 
attorneys or trained union representatives, offers a benefit to 
employees that may help unions recruit new members. Addi-
tionally, representation in arbitration can be a part of a work-
ers’ rights campaign against employer-imposed arbitration sys-
tems that limit the legal rights of employees. Representation 
can provide a membership benefit to accompany new forms of 
union membership recently announced by the AFL-CIO for em-
ployees who are not in collective bargaining units.6
 
 4. Other scholars have previously recognized the opportunities for un-
ions to become service providers in the nonunion workplace and build such 
representation into majority representation. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom 
of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-
Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (1996); Matthew W. Finkin, 
Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Repre-
sentation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 75, 86–89 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: 
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 
81–83 (1993); Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Work-
place, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 205–13 (1991). The program proposed here builds 
on that suggested by Professor Finkin. The need for such a program is even 
greater today as a result of the limitations on class actions that have devel-
oped since his initial proposal, which threaten further the ability of employees 
to vindicate their statutory rights.  
 Accordingly, 
unions should explore cost-effective methods of providing such 
benefits to enhance workplace justice for all employees.  
 5. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 206. 
 6. Michelle Amber, After Trumka Keynote, Convention Votes to Impel All 
Workers to Join Labor Movement, 174 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (Sept. 9, 
2013) (reporting on a resolution to authorize development of new forms of 
workplace representation and advocacy outside of collective bargaining units 
in collaboration with affiliate unions). 
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This Article analyzes the possibility of creating a program 
to provide representation to workers bound to arbitrate their 
legal disputes with their employers, while at the same time 
building a movement to challenge the practice of compulsory 
arbitration and its impact on workers’ rights. First, I briefly re-
view the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence and 
its impact on workers, with a particular focus on the limita-
tions on class actions. Then I move to a discussion of the ad-
vantages and challenges to the creation of such a program. Fi-
nally, I examine some alternative visions of what such a 
program might look like, highlighting the risks and benefits of 
different structures. While there is no doubt that there are 
challenges in implementing the proposal, there are also oppor-
tunities to build a movement of workers fighting for workplace 
justice across workplace boundaries. It is those opportunities 
that offer new hope to the labor movement. 
I.  THE COURT’S ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE AND 
ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYEES   
Once the Supreme Court began to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims,7 the move to enforce workplace arbi-
tration agreements was almost inevitable. Employment cases 
comprise a substantial part of the federal docket, and judges of-
ten view such cases with distaste.8 Arbitration removes the 
cases from court and places them in a private system of dispute 
resolution, similar to that in the unionized workplace. The dif-
ference, of course, is that most employees with such “agree-
ments” have no union representation.9
A. THE GROWTH OF ARBITRATION 
 
In 1991, the Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate an 
age discrimination claim made in a securities registration ap-
plication, finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act did not preclude agreements to resolve such claims in a dif-
 
 7. This occurred in the Mitsubishi Trilogy in the 1980s. See Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481–86 (1989); Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241–42 (1987); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–40 (1985).  
 8. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage 
from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS 
L.J. 399, 448–49, 449 n.176 (2000). 
 9. Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Sec-
tion 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 191 (2003). 
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ferent forum than the courts.10 Ten years later, the Court’s tor-
tured reading of the exclusion for employment contracts in the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) opened the floodgates for en-
forcement of arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a 
condition of employment.11
Employee plaintiffs and their lawyers have resisted arbi-
tration, resulting in a multitude of cases at all levels of the 
state and federal court systems challenging arbitration agree-
ments. Over the objections of employees, some courts have or-
dered arbitration of legal claims where rights that would be 
available in litigation are limited. Arbitration agreements may 
be enforced even where discovery is limited, where damages are 
limited, where the statute of limitations is shortened, or where 
the employee pays part of the cost of arbitration (unless that 
cost is prohibitive).
 These cases signaled to employers 
that they could shift employees’ statutory claims to the arbitral 
forum.  
12 Where the unilaterally adopted arbitra-
tion procedure is too favorable to the employer, however, a 
court will not order arbitration.13 Several theories have been 
used to challenge these arbitration agreements. Where the un-
derlying statute prohibits arbitration agreements for the statu-
tory claims, courts will not order arbitration.14
 
 10. See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
 This is also the 
 11. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). 
 12. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000) 
(holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate despite the agreement’s silence on 
fees since she had the burden of showing prohibitive costs); Carter v. Coun-
trywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298–99 (5th Cir. 2004) (ordering ar-
bitration despite discovery limitations); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 
1255, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2003) (ordering arbitration despite a provision that 
the loser pays the fees of the other party and holding such a provision insuffi-
cient to show that arbitration is cost-prohibitive); Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. 
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir. 1997) (ordering arbitration despite a 
shortened statute of limitations and a waiver of punitive damages and holding 
that whether the employee waived the longer statute and punitive damages 
were questions for the arbitrator). 
 13. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“We hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules—especially the 
scheme whereby one party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel—
breaches the contract entered into by the parties.”).  
 14. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Most employment statutes were enacted well 
before the Supreme Court authorized arbitration of statutory claims, however, 
and do not bar arbitration. Cf., e.g., Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (listing several important federal employment stat-
utes enacted prior to the 1980s). 
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case when there is no real agreement to arbitrate.15 Further, 
where a statutory claim cannot be effectively vindicated in ar-
bitration, the employee can go to court despite the arbitration 
agreement.16 Finally, arbitration agreements are subject to the 
same defenses as enforcement of any contract, such as duress 
and unconscionability.17
While some state and federal courts have been vigilant 
about these defenses,
 
18 the Supreme Court has whittled away 
at them in recent years, casting doubt on their continuing via-
bility.19 The Supreme Court has played an important role, even 
in the state court cases, frequently finding that the FAA 
preempts state laws that prevent enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate legal claims.20
 
 15. See Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315–16 
(6th Cir. 2000) (finding the agreement to arbitrate was illusory because the 
arbitration provider reserved the right to modify all the rules and procedures 
without the consent of the employee). 
 The result is growing enforcement of 
unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements to prevent em-
ployees from litigating statutory claims. The Supreme Court 
 16. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90. The Court’s decision in American Express 
v. Italian Colors Restaurant casts some doubt on the scope of this defense to 
arbitration by finding that the high cost of individual arbitration relative to 
the claim did not create an inability to vindicate statutory rights, and by up-
holding a class action ban in an arbitration agreement. Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013). 
 17. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 686–87 (1996). 
 18. See, e.g., Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1084 (9th Cir. 
2007) (invalidating as unconscionable an arbitration agreement imposed in a 
contract of adhesion with reduced statutes of limitations, confidentiality provi-
sions, exemptions for employer claims against employees, and a ban on admin-
istrative complaints); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 
P.3d 669, 694, 698–99 (Cal. 2000) (refusing to enforce an adhesive contract as 
unconscionable because it bound the employee but not the employer to arbi-
trate claims and it restricted damages). 
 19. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (finding that inability to 
vindicate statutory rights because of the high cost of an individual claim rela-
tive to a class action does not render a class waiver unenforceable); AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (invalidating a Cali-
fornia law finding class waivers in adhesion contracts unconscionable). 
 20. See, e.g., Nitro–Lift Techs. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503–04 (2012) 
(reversing the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court finding noncompeti-
tion agreements unenforceable under state law, and finding that the FAA re-
quired arbitration of the issue of the validity of the noncompetition covenants); 
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008) (“We hold today that, when 
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws 
lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum . . . are superseded by the 
FAA.”).  
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has been particularly active in addressing the impact of arbi-
tration agreements on class actions. 
B. FOCUS ON CLASS ACTIONS 
Class actions are the legal bane of businesses. They enable 
large groups of consumers or employees to band together to sue 
the employer in one action. They are particularly useful for 
cases where each plaintiff has a small claim that would cost 
more to litigate than the claim is worth. Litigating as a group 
makes it cost-effective to bring the case.21 Thus, the ability to 
bring a class action may increase the business’s vulnerability to 
legal claims. Additionally, class actions are costly and time-
consuming to litigate.22 They often attract media attention and 
accordingly may affect a company’s reputation.23 As a result, 
there is considerable pressure on companies to settle such 
claims when they are filed.24
Aided by the Supreme Court, businesses have discovered a 
new way to eliminate class actions. As the result of a series of 
Supreme Court decisions, arbitration now serves that function. 
In another trilogy of arbitration cases since 2010, the Court has 
held that: (1) class arbitration cannot be ordered where an arbi-
tration agreement does not explicitly provide for it;
 
25 (2) a Cali-
fornia rule that invalidated most class action waivers in arbi-
tration agreements as unconscionable was preempted by the 
FAA;26 and (3) a class action waiver is enforceable even if an 
individual claim would cost more to litigate than is available in 
damages, rejecting the argument that the arbitration agree-
ment denied effective vindication of the statutory claim.27
The Court first addressed this issue in 2010 in Stolt–
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which in-
volved review of a decision by a panel of arbitrators to order 
  
 
 21. Cf., e.g., Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 
2013) (noting the plaintiff’s claim that “pursuing individual arbitration would 
be ‘prohibitively expensive’ because the recovery she seeks is dwarfed by the 
costs of individual arbitration”). 
 22. Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: Avoiding 
Employment Class Actions, 26 EMP. REL. L.J., Autumn 2000, at 5, 20–21. 
 23. Id. at 21. 
 24. Id. at 6, 22–23. 
 25. Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 
(2010). 
 26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 27. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 
(2013).  
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class arbitration where the parties stipulated that the arbitra-
tion agreement was silent on the issue.28 Finding that the arbi-
trators’ decision was based only on their own notions of good 
public policy, the Court found that arbitrators could not order 
class arbitration where the parties had not agreed to it, noting 
the vast differences between individual and class arbitration.29
The following year, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the 
Court found that the FAA preempted a California law designed 
to protect consumers from class action waivers found uncon-
scionable.
  
30
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which dis-
putes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money . . . .
 The Discover Bank rule held class waivers uncon-
scionable where they are: 
31
Although the FAA allows for the application of generally 
applicable contract defenses, the Court found that the law stood 
at odds with the accomplishment of the FAA’s purpose of en-
forcing arbitration agreements and therefore was preempted.
 
32 
“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes 
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”33
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant completed 
the formula for eliminating class actions through arbitration 
agreements.
  
34 The Second Circuit had ruled that the class ac-
tion waiver was unenforceable because without a class action, 
the plaintiffs could not vindicate their statutory rights given 
the high cost of expert testimony in this antitrust case.35
 
 28. 559 U.S. at 668–69. 
 Alt-
hough the Court had found in previous cases that arbitration 
would not be ordered when a plaintiff could not effectively vin-
dicate a statutory right in arbitration, the majority ruled that 
this exception did not apply when it was too costly to enforce a 
 29. Id. at 670–76.  
 30. 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1753. 
 31. Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1110 (Cal. 2000)). 
 32. Id. at 1748. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 
(2013). 
 35. Id. at 2308.  
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right in an individual action because the expense of litigation 
would exceed the potential recovery.36
None of these cases was an employment case, but each was 
an interpretation of the FAA, which has been interpreted to 
cover arbitration agreements in the employment setting.
  
37 Tak-
en together these cases hold that a class action waiver in an 
arbitration agreement is enforceable unless the particular stat-
ute states otherwise and that unless the arbitration agreement 
expressly provides for class arbitration, no class claim is avail-
able in the arbitral forum.38
Given employers’ fear of class actions, these cases seem 
likely to spur even more employers to impose arbitration 
agreements on employees unilaterally. One development does 
offer faint hope for employees. In D.R. Horton, Inc., the NLRB 
found that employers who bar class claims in both arbitral and 
judicial forums violate the National Labor Relations Act be-
cause class actions are concerted activity protected by the stat-
ute.
  
39 The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement in Horton on ap-
peal,40 however, and most other courts that have considered the 
issue have rejected the application of Horton in actions to en-
force arbitration agreements.41 And Horton allows employers to 
force arbitration so long as a class action is available in arbitra-
tion.42
 
 36. Id. at 2310–11.  
 It seems likely that arbitration agreements in employ-
ment will continue to grow, which could have profound negative 
 37. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113–19 (2001). 
 38. In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter the Court did enforce an award 
where the arbitrator found that the agreement allowed class actions, although 
there was no express provision so stating. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 
133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013). That case, however, is based on the broad defer-
ence to the arbitrator’s decision. Id. at 2068. If the parties do not agree to al-
low the arbitrator to decide the issue of availability of class actions, the case 
would not apply. 
 39. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 6, 13 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 40. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(denying enforcement in relevant part). 
 41. Three circuits have already rejected the Horton decision. See Richards 
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11-17530, at 5 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2013) (per curiam); 
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen 
v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013). The author be-
lieves that Horton was correctly decided and, in fact, that unilaterally imposed 
arbitration agreements in general violate the NLRA as applied to both class 
and individual claims. See Hodges, supra note 9, at 237. This is not the trend 
in the courts, however. 
 42. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 12–13. 
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effects on employees limited to the arbitral forum and deprived 
of the right to litigate as a class. 
C. IMPACT OF ARBITRATION’S GROWTH 
For the employer, the arbitral forum offers certain ad-
vantages over litigation. It is not public, it is faster and often 
cheaper than litigation, and the case is not heard by a jury that 
may be more sympathetic to an employee than a business.43 Be-
cause the employer often has better access to the evidence 
needed to prove an employment case, discovery limitations will 
make the employee’s case more difficult in the arbitral forum.44 
If the agreement shortens statutes of limitations or limits dam-
ages that would be available in court, those provisions also 
benefit the employer.45 There is some evidence that employers, 
as repeat players in arbitration, benefit from that status, as 
compared to employees who are not repeat players.46 Employers 
may be able to secure both better arbitrators and more favora-
ble decisions because of their repeat-player status.47 And, of 
course, the class action limitations are extremely valuable, par-
ticularly where the employee’s claims are of low value individ-
ually but large value collectively.48 Because of the difficulties 
created by the arbitral forum and the unavailability of class ac-
tions, many plaintiffs’ attorneys decline to represent employees 
who are limited to arbitration.49
 
 43. Cf. Green, supra note 
 As a result, legal rights go un-
enforced and employee protections become mythical. 
8, at 454–62 (explaining employers’ questiona-
ble, yet nonetheless extant fears of jury trials and excessive litigation fees). 
 44. Cf. Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298–99 
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting that discovery in arbitration was less extensive than in 
litigation, though not finding the limitations sufficiently prohibitive). 
 45. See Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir. 
1997). Empirical research suggests that employees who win their cases in 
court receive greater damages than in arbitration but the studies do not in-
clude those cases that settle prior to litigation, which may affect the findings. 
Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace Disputes, 
in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 383–85 (Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009). 
 46. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 47. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 379–80. 
 48. A prime example would be claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
or state wage law for overtime pay or work off the clock. See Hodges, supra 
note 9, at 215–16. 
 49. Cf. Rabin, supra note 4, at 220–21 (“Lawyers are trained to be com-
bative, and they often structure their fees on the basis of time spent. What 
would make them turn instead to quick, inexpensive and less dramatic fo-
rums?”). 
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Arbitration is not a panacea for employers, however. Many 
employment cases are decided in favor of the employer on 
summary judgment motions, before a trial is held.50 Summary 
judgment may not be available in arbitration,51 although evi-
dence indicates its use is increasing.52 Further, the arbitrator 
must be paid directly while judges are paid by the taxpayers. 
And the ability to appeal arbitration decisions is extremely lim-
ited, which is beneficial for the winner, but not the loser.53 Also, 
because employee lawyers are likely to challenge arbitral 
agreements, they may result in costly enforcement litigation.54
There is no central repository for data on how many em-
ployers use arbitration agreements. Estimates vary.
 
Accordingly, there are some counterincentives for employers 
considering implementation of an arbitration agreement. 
55 The class 
action decisions from the last several years, however, are likely 
to increase consideration of such agreements, particularly by 
employers who may see themselves as vulnerable to class 
claims.56 As arbitration increases, employees will find it more 
difficult to enforce their rights because of inability to find legal 
representation and enforcement costs.57
 
 50. See, e.g., Green, supra note 
 As will be developed in 
the next section, unions, using either attorneys or trained un-
ion representatives, may help fill the gap. 
8, at 451–52. 
 51. See id. at 470. 
 52. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: 
What Kind of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 72–73 (2014) (finding that motions for summary judgment 
were made in 23.9% of 217 arbitration cases studied from the American Arbi-
tration Association in 2008). Defendants received a full or partial grant of 
summary judgment in 37 of the 52 cases in which a motion was made. Id. at 
19. 
 53. Green, supra note 8, at 426. 
 54. Id. at 422.  
 55. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbi-
tration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
405, 408–12 (2007) (reviewing existing studies and stating that “a current es-
timate in the range of 15 to 25 percent of employers having adopted employ-
ment arbitration seems reasonable”). These studies preceded the recent cases 
upholding arbitral bans on class actions, which almost certainly increased the 
attractiveness of arbitration. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The 
Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
373, 427 (2005) (suggesting that upholding class action waivers in consumer 
and employee arbitration clauses will spur business to increase the use of the-
se clauses and advance the end of class action litigation, absent action to pre-
vent businesses from imposing waivers). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 411. 
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II.  OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNIONS   
While the developments in the courts that allow employers 
to divert legal claims to arbitral forums create significant diffi-
culties for employees in enforcing their rights, they may offer 
an opportunity for unions to offer representation in arbitration 
to build membership. Declines in membership have weakened 
union power and reduced the number of employees who see the 
value in union membership.58 Many employees have an inflated 
view of their rights in the nonunion workplace.59
Unions, using either attorneys or trained lay union repre-
sentatives, could provide representation to workers with com-
pulsory arbitration agreements for legal claims in workplaces 
without collective bargaining agreements. The representation 
could include not only the arbitration proceeding itself, but also 
any steps preceding arbitration, such as a grievance procedure 
or mediation.
 Educating 
employees about their real rights and the difficulties of en-
forcement of those rights in the absence of union representation 
could pay dividends for unions in increasing membership and 
power.  
60 Such services could be provided as a benefit of 
at-large61
 
 58. See Josh Levis, Analysis: Why America’s Unions Are Losing Power, 
CNN (Dec. 12, 2012, 04:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/union 
-power-analysis. 
 membership in the union. This attractive benefit may 
help recruit members outside the traditional method of organiz-
ing a collective bargaining unit. As some members take ad-
vantage of the arbitration representation, others in the same 
workplace will see the value of union membership. As member-
ship builds, the union will eventually attain enough members 
to seek majority representation rights.  
 59. See generally Ian H. Eliasoph, Know Your (Lack of) Rights: Reexamin-
ing the Causes and Effects of Phantom Employment Rights, 12 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 197 (2009); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Explor-
ing the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447; 
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 
(1997). 
 60. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American 
Labor Unions¸ 69 MO. L. REV. 365, 388, 421 (2004) (suggesting representing 
employees in nonunion workplaces in mediation); see also Ann C. Hodges, 
Strategies for Combating Sexual Harassment: The Role of Labor Unions, 15 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 183, 226 (2006) (suggesting unions join with other organi-
zations to challenge harassment in the nonunion workplace). 
 61. At large members would be those who are not a part of an existing col-
lective bargaining unit. The AFL-CIO has indicated an interest in recruiting 
at large members. See Amber, supra note 6, at C-1. 
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The next section will discuss some of the advantages and 
risks to unions of developing a program to provide arbitral as-
sistance to individual employees as a means of developing 
membership. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL 
1. The Need for Representation and Its Potential as a 
Recruitment Device 
Most employer-created arbitration processes allow employ-
ees a representative of their choice, if only to ensure legal en-
forcement and ability to obtain arbitrators.62 Because of the dif-
ficulty of obtaining counsel for arbitration, many employees 
with claims will have a need for representation. In general, pri-
vate attorneys representing employees must take cases that 
provide promise for substantial recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
costs in order to maintain their practices.63 To do this, they con-
sider several interrelated factors in selecting among potential 
clients. These factors include the strength of the claim, the po-
tential for damages, the availability of attorneys’ fees and the 
right to a jury trial.64
 
 62. The Due Process Protocol, developed by representatives of the Nation-
al Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers’ Association 
and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution set forth the elements 
for a fair arbitration procedure, which included employee choice of representa-
tives. See A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship, NAT’L ACAD. ARB. (May 
9, 1995), http://www.naarb.org/proceedings/pdfs/1995-298.pdf. The National 
Academy of Arbitrators, an organization of professional arbitrators whose 
members are chosen using rigorous standards of excellence, advises its mem-
bers to be cautious in accepting arbitral appointments where one party is un-
represented. See Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration, NAT’L ACAD. 
ARB. (May 20, 2009), https://www.naarb.org/due_process.asp. The American 
Arbitration Association will decline to administer arbitration if the process 
“substantially and materially deviates” from the Due Process Protocol. Em-
ployment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N (Nov. 1, 
2005), https://www.adr.org/aaa/showproperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_ 
004362&revision=latestreleased; see also CPR Employment Dispute Resolution 
Procedure, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., http://www 
.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/630/CPR-Employment 
-Dispute-Arbitration-Procedure.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (indicating that 
CPR reserves the right to refuse to administer any procedure if the employer 
and employee do not have the right to choose their own representatives). 
 While very highly paid employees may be 
able to afford to pay a lawyer to handle their case, most em-
 63. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 33. 
 64. Id. 
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ployees, particularly those who have been terminated, need 
representation on a contingency basis so that the fees will come 
out of the recovery.65 Additionally, many employment statutes 
provide attorneys’ fees and costs to successful plaintiffs as part 
of the recovery.66
The size of the potential damage recovery is also a factor as 
the attorney risks being insufficiently compensated for the time 
invested unless there is a substantial likelihood of a significant 
recovery of damages. Unless the facts are egregious, making an 
award of significant punitive damages likely and/or a victory 
with accompanying attorneys’ fees more certain, lower-wage 
employees will have more difficulty finding counsel than high-
er-paid employees because their damages will be smaller.
 A strong claim is more likely to result in ei-
ther a litigation victory or a favorable settlement, which will 
lead to compensation for the attorney, either from the defend-
ant or a percentage of the client’s recovery. But if the plaintiff 
does not win the case, the attorney gets no compensation. 
67 For 
the same reason, class actions are preferable to individual 
claims because aggregating damages makes the potential for 
recovering adequate fees to cover the attorneys’ investment of 
time more likely.68 Further, the employer may be more likely to 
settle a class action because of the size of the damages, the cost 
of the litigation,69 and the potential for bad press. Finally, the 
availability of a jury trial is important because conventional 
wisdom, supported by some data,70 is that juries are more likely 
to rule in favor of plaintiffs and to award significant damages.71
 
 65. Id. at 14. 
  
 66. For a list of some statutes that provide for recovery of fees, see infra 
note 188.  
 67. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 31–33 (describing results of a 
study of arbitration cases showing that “the economic calculus will make it dif-
ficult for plaintiff attorneys to accept cases unless they offer relatively high 
damages and strong prospects of winning”).  
 68. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Players 
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 198–201 (1997). 
 69. While in theory class claims are less costly for defendants because 
they combine multiple claims in one proceeding, the reality is that most class 
members would not litigate individual cases so the cost savings are often more 
theoretical than real. See Sudbury & Towns, supra note 22, at 20.  
 70. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 385; see also Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and 
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 8–11 (2011) (finding median damage 
awards five to ten times greater in employment litigation than in employment 
arbitration). 
 71. Bingham, supra note 68, at 199. 
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Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage 
payment statutes create particular difficulty for plaintiffs. Of-
ten the damages for any one individual are relatively small: a 
failure to pay overtime, for example, or a requirement that an 
employee work off the clock for a few hours a week. Where the 
employer makes a practice of these violations, such as by mis-
classifying employees as exempt when they are not or as inde-
pendent contractors when they are employees, damages for a 
class may be significant.72 A collective action73
A recent study of employment arbitration found that al-
most a third of employees in employer-promulgated arbitration 
procedures represented themselves.
 provides signifi-
cant potential for recovery of attorneys’ fees, but an individual 
claim in arbitration will be unattractive to most attorneys. 
74 Further, even those em-
ployees who had a lawyer were far less likely than their em-
ployer to have a lawyer with experience in employment law.75 
Representation was an important predictor of employee win 
rates as well as the amount of damages, which increased sub-
stantially.76
Accordingly there is a need for representation in these cas-
es which the union can fill. Public sector unions have recruited 
members for many years with the promise of legal representa-
tion in disputes relating to employment.
  
77
 
 72. The FLSA allows employees to collect back pay for two years, three if 
the violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2012). 
 Both teachers’ unions 
and police officers’ unions have been successful in maintaining 
membership, even in states that do not allow collective bargain-
ing, by offering legal representation as a benefit of member-
 73. The FLSA provides for opt-in collective actions rather than class ac-
tions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(2012). 
 74. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 15. 
 75. Id. at 16.  
 76. Id. at 27–28; see also LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN, RICHARD 
A. BALES, & STEPHEN F. BEFORT, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 825 (3d. ed. 2014) 
(citing a study showing that the outcome of disputes is similar if both parties 
or neither party is represented but where one party has legal representation 
and the other does not, the represented party is more likely to win). But see 
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 800 n.93, 818 (2003) (finding similar win 
rates for low income employees in arbitration with and without counsel). 
 77. See Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargain-
ing: Real Harms and Imaginary Benefits, AM. CONST. SOC. FOR L. & POL’Y 1–2 
(2011), http://acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf. 
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ship.78 Teachers sued by students or fired in violation of tenure 
statutes can obtain legal representation paid by the union.79 
Similarly, police officers who are disciplined, discharged, or 
sued by citizens can obtain legal representation as union mem-
bers.80 Both of these professions have a significant risk of suits 
being filed against them by the members of the public they 
serve, which provides a particular inducement for the benefit of 
union-paid legal representation.81
2. Using Existing Arbitral Expertise and Balancing Employer 
Power 
 However, unions can also ed-
ucate employees without similar risk, but who may have legal 
claims against their employer that they cannot afford to liti-
gate, to recognize the value of the benefit. As discussed in the 
following sections, unions that provide such representation can 
use it to build membership and thus union strength and to im-
prove the enforcement of workers’ rights, benefiting union and 
nonunion workers alike. 
Unions that offer this benefit can use their existing exper-
tise to assist workers in arbitration of legal claims. Most collec-
tive bargaining agreements contain arbitration provisions for 
contractual violations, and unions regularly arbitrate these 
claims.82
 
 78. See, e.g., We’ve Got You Covered, VA. EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.veanea 
.org/home/300.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). But see Craig Gilbert, The Poli-
tics of Wisconsin’s Declining Union Membership, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Feb. 9, 2013, http://www.jsonline/blogs/news/190545131.html. 
 Thus union lawyers and union representatives have 
 79. See, e.g., Higher Education Faculty & Staff: About Us, NAT’L EDUC. 
ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/34718.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); Your 
Benefits: Legal and Financial Services, AM. FED’N TEACHERS, http://www 
.aft.org/benefits/legal.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 80. See, e.g., FRATERNAL ORDER POLICE DEFENSE PLAN, http://www 
.foplegal.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); L.A. POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, 
http://lapd.com/about/services (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 81. See, e.g., Kevin Oates, Professor Defend Thyself: The Failure of Uni-
versities to Defend and Indemnify Their Faculty, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1063, 
1063–64 (2003) (discussing the increasing number of lawsuits against univer-
sity professors); W. VA. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, COPING WITH POLICE MISCONDUCT IN WEST VIRGINIA 8 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr122004024 
296.pdf (indicating that police officers in West Virginia must pay any damages 
exceeding the state cap); We’ve Got You Covered, VA. EDUC. ASS’N, http://www 
.veanea.org/home/300.htm (last visited Apr. 4 2014) (describing the legal bene-
fits of association membership).  
 82. See COOPER, NOLAN, BALES, & BEFORT note supra 76 at 20 (indicating 
that 99% of collective bargaining agreements contain provisions to arbitrate at 
least some grievances). 
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extensive experience in the arbitral forum. While the employer-
created arbitration forum will not be identical to the labor arbi-
tration forum, the experience will still be valuable. 
In addition, unions can balance the repeat player effect 
that benefits employers in legal arbitration.83 Employers who 
have arbitrated previously are more successful in arbitration 
and when they have arbitrated before the same arbitrator, they 
are even more likely to win.84 Additionally, employees recover 
more when the employer is not a repeat player than when it 
is.85
One possible explanation for the repeat player effect is the 
experience gained in prior arbitrations while another is that 
repeat player employers may screen out meritorious cases, set-
tling them prior to arbitration.
  
86 Another possibility is that ar-
bitrators maximize their chances of being reemployed by favor-
ing the repeat player in close cases.87 Finally, employees may 
lack knowledge about arbitrator backgrounds or the importance 
of arbitrator backgrounds that may influence the decision be-
cause of their lack of experience with arbitration.88
Currently, even those employees with representation in 
employer-promulgated arbitration have attorneys with em-
ployment law experience far less often than their employers.
 
89 
Further, employer attorneys are far more likely to be repeat 
players in arbitration than employee attorneys.90
Data on labor arbitration where unions are involved in the 
process show that employee win rates tend to be higher.
  
91 While 
some of the disparities relate to differences in the forum and 
the norms that have developed in each,92
 
 83. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Con-
tracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration 
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998). 
 others may be at-
 84. Id. at 234, 238; Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 379–80. 
 85. Bingham, supra note 83, at 234. This research does not reveal the rea-
son for the repeat player effect but only its existence. Mahony & Wheeler, su-
pra note 45, at 380.  
 86. Bingham, supra note 83, at 234; Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 
380. 
 87. Bingham, supra note 83, at 242. 
 88. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 389–90. 
 89. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 16.  
 90. Id. at 13 (finding in a study of 217 arbitration cases from 2008 that 
only 11% of cases involved a repeat player attorney for the employee while 
54% of cases involved an employer with a repeat player attorney). 
 91. Id. at 382–83. 
 92. Id. at 382, 385–86. 
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tributable to the comparative lack of experience of employers 
and employees and the fact that only the employer will be in a 
position to use the arbitrator in the future. These two factors 
that harm employee chances in arbitration can be remedied 
through experienced union representation. The union can as-
sist in selecting an appropriate arbitrator, effectively represent 
the employee in the hearing and any pre- and post-hearing pro-
ceedings, and appear to the arbitrator as a repeat player who 
can affect future business. Thus, while arbitration is viewed by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys with skepticism, the union may provide 
employees a better chance for success in the forum. 
3. Demonstration of Value to Build Membership 
Representing employees in arbitration provides an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the value of union membership to indi-
viduals. As noted above, finding an attorney to enforce rights in 
arbitration is difficult.93 Employees with claims will quickly re-
alize that their rights are relatively ephemeral without a viable 
means to enforce them. While an employee might be able to ar-
bitrate without representation, represented employees fare bet-
ter in arbitration when the employer also has representation.94
Representation offers an immediate and tangible value to 
the employee that is also visible to other employees.
 
While there is always the potential that an employee who loses 
in arbitration will blame the union, an effective advocate will 
educate the employee about the risks of loss and demonstrate 
the value of representation, win or lose. 
95 The un-
ion can use the opportunity provided by representation to in-
form the employee(s) of other benefits of union membership and 
representation such as a union-sponsored training, collective 
bargaining agreements, just cause protection against discharge, 
and union representation on the job site.96
 
 93. See supra notes 
 Arbitration prepara-
62–73 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA’s Legacy: Collective or Indi-
vidual Dispute Resolution or Not?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 249, 261 n.67 
(2011). 
 95. One difficulty with this strategy is that many of the cases may involve 
employees who have been terminated, limiting their continued contact with 
their coworkers. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 13 (showing only 5% of 
217 American Arbitration Association cases in 2008 involved employees who 
were still employed). It is possible, however, that the availability of union rep-
resentation in arbitration may encourage more employees to bring claims 
while still employed. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., The Union Advantages: Facts & Figures, SERVICE EMPS. 
INT’L UNION, http://www.seiu.org/a/ourunion/research/union-advantage-facts 
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tion done at a union facility presents a chance for the client to 
make connections with other union members and union staff 
and learn more about the union. Motivated employees who 
demonstrate leadership potential could be trained to organize 
and educate other workers at the workplace or in the particular 
industry about the union and the benefits of representation, in-
cluding the opportunity to obtain representation for legal 
claims. Indeed, if particularly skilled individuals are identified, 
they might even be trained to represent employees from their 
workplace in arbitration of similar claims.97
Wage and hour claims, where many employees are treated 
similarly in pay denials, might be particularly susceptible to 
this sort of treatment. Once one or two claims are litigated in 
arbitration, a litigation formula is established that should work 
for similar claims without the need for a trained lawyer to han-
dle the case. In fact, after some number of successful arbitra-
tions, it is likely that the cases will settle quickly and the bene-
fits of the union will be tangibly demonstrated to all employees. 
  
4. Ensuring Enforcement of the Law 
Helping workers enforce rights violated by their nonunion 
employers raises the floor for all workers, including union 
workers. Research has demonstrated that employees in union-
ized workplaces are more likely to enforce their rights.98
 
-and-figures.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (describing the spectrum of benefits 
for union members). 
 Com-
 97. But see infra notes 130–40, 184–88 and accompanying text regarding 
representation by non-lawyers. 
 98. See John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, The Effect of Union on the Re-
ceipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 478, 
488 (1997) (finding that unionized employees are more likely than nonunion 
employees to collect unemployment compensation benefits, even after control-
ling for differences in demographics, unemployment compensation systems, 
and jobs); Barry T. Hirsch, David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 
Workers’ Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces, 50 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 218, 233 (1997) (finding that unionized workers 
were more likely to file workers’ compensation claims and more likely to re-
ceive workers’ compensation benefits); Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, 
Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 77 
(1986) (finding correlation between union activism and filing of lawsuits); 
Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 134–36 
(finding that both union activism and grievance filing were positively associat-
ed with filing of lawsuits and discrimination charges); Alison D. Morantz, Does 
Unionization Strengthen Regulatory Enforcement? An Empirical Study of the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 697, 
712–13 (2011) (finding MSHA inspections in unionized mines are more fre-
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pliance with legal requirements raises costs for employers. 
Nonunion employers who ignore the law can make it difficult 
for unionized and compliant employers to compete. Accordingly, 
just as it is in the interest of unions to raise wages of nonunion 
employers to avoid the race to the bottom, it is in their interest 
to force all employers to comply with the law.  
To the extent that greater enforcement of law by union 
members is due to the lack of fear of retaliation because of the 
protection of a union contract,99 offering representation to 
workers who have no contract will not increase enforcement. 
Another part of the explanation, however, is the union’s educa-
tion of workers about their rights and representational support 
in enforcing them.100
Having reviewed some of the benefits of the proposed rep-
resentational model, I now turn to the concerns and risks that 
unions must consider before implementing this proposal. 
 Thus, education and representation of 
workers in unorganized workplaces will result in greater en-
forcement of the laws and benefit those in unionized workplac-
es as well. Unionized workers will benefit because their em-
ployers will not be threatened by nonunion competitors who 
can offer lower prices based on avoidance of legal compliance. 
Reducing the difference in cost structure between union and 
nonunion employers will make it easier for the union to negoti-
ate better employment terms for unionized workers. 
B. MINIMIZING RISKS FOR THE UNION  
Implementing a program to provide representation in arbi-
tration to employees in unorganized workplaces is not without 
risk. The program must be carefully developed and implement-
ed as part of an effort to increase union membership and legal 
enforcement to benefit all members of the union. The sections 
 
quent, last longer, and result in higher proposed fines); David Weil, Enforcing 
OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 26–34 (1991) (finding 
that unions increase enforcement of OSHA in the manufacturing sector, re-
sulting in more frequent inspections, more employee representation on inspec-
tions, more intense inspections, greater numbers of violations found and 
greater penalties); David Weil, Employee Rights, Unions, and the Implementa-
tion of Labor Policies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL INDUS. 
REL. RES. ASS’N MEETING 474, 476 (1993) (analyzing various studies and con-
cluding that unions improve enforcement of various laws, including the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, OSHA, MSHA, certain provisions of ERISA, workers’ 
compensation laws and unemployment compensation laws).  
 99. See Budd & McCall, supra note 98, at 490–91. 
 100. Id. 
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below analyze several significant issues that must be consid-
ered in program design and implementation. 
1. Remaining a Movement and Not Just a Service Provider 
Using legal action as a primary strategy for developing and 
maintaining a social movement risks losing the very individu-
als that the union is trying to recruit.101 Because legal action 
requires a level of expertise that the average worker does not 
possess, an organization trying to use litigation (or arbitration) 
to build worker membership may instead cause workers to feel 
disempowered and disconnected.102 Thus, the process must be 
carefully constructed to involve the employees and to engage 
them in the broader organization, not just their own arbitra-
tion. Otherwise, once the arbitration is over, the employee will 
have no lasting connection to the organization.103 It is im-
portant that the union remain a movement, not a service or-
ganization for its members.104
Worker centers,
  
105 which often provide legal representation 
for low wage workers, have struggled with this question of bal-
ancing the use of organizing and legal action to effectuate social 
change, while increasing and retaining membership.106
 
 101. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litiga-
tion: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 604, 604 
(2009); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and 
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 455–56 (2001) (summarizing critiques); 
Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing: Experiences 
from the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339, 353–54 (2008). 
 Lessons 
 102. See JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS 323–24 
(2010) (arguing that unions have placed too much value on professionalism 
which results in a gulf between the leadership and the rank and file); COREY 
S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME 
CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 23 (2009) (identifying problems 
with the necessary use of legal expertise to initiate change which may result 
in lawyers dominating the process). 
 103. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 300–02 (2005) (describ-
ing challenge of using individual representation to generate collective action 
and suggesting ways to facilitate the process). 
 104. Nicole A. Archer et al., The Garment Worker Center and the “Forever 
21” Campaign, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE LA MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND 
ADVOCACY 154, 162 (Ruth Milkman et al. eds., 2009). 
 105. “Worker centers are community-based mediating institutions that 
provide support to low wage workers.” JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: OR-
GANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 2 (2006). They focus on 
three prongs of action: service, advocacy and organizing. Id. 
 106. Archer et al., supra note 104 at 160–64 (describing the Garment 
Worker Center’s struggle to maintain involved membership in a campaign 
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learned from these groups include the importance of clear 
communication between workers and legal advocates, involve-
ment of employees in decisions of the organization, and devel-
opment of leadership among the employees.107 Jennifer Gordon, 
who founded a worker center, describes the use of law not only 
to vindicate specific legal rights but also to challenge the sys-
tem and foster collective activity through legislative action, 
protest, alliance building, and publicity.108 For example, a group 
of workers represented by the union might use multiple indi-
vidual claims in arbitration to impose a cost on the employer 
who has deprived the employees of the class action option.109
Another advantage of making arbitration representation 
part of a broader campaign for workers’ rights is that it reduces 
the adverse consequences of losing a case. Employee win rates 
in employment arbitration are not high, especially when the 
individual arbitration agreements of high-powered executives 
are excluded from the data.
 
Regardless of victory in individual actions, the workers may 
build solidarity around the goal of regaining their right to col-
lective litigation of claims. Workers may also be motivated to 
support changes in the law relating to arbitration to allow not 
only workplace, but also consumer class actions. Using arbitra-
tion as part of a movement to increase workers’ rights broadens 
the goal beyond just winning a particular arbitration. Having 
broader goals reduces the risk that workers will abandon the 
union once the arbitration is over.  
110
 
that focused on legal action); GORDON, supra note 
 While union representation may 
increase the win rate, there will still be lost cases, perhaps 
many. If the goal is not just winning a case, but imposing a cost 
on the employer and educating workers and the public about 
the loss of rights through unilaterally-imposed arbitration, em-
ployees are less likely to blame their representatives if a case is 
lost. The employees can then be motivated to educate their 
coworkers about the problems with the arbitration procedure 
103, at 300; Narro, supra 
note 101, at 342–43. 
 107. GORDON, supra note 103, at 291–94 (describing the importance of a 
culture of democracy); Archer, supra note 104, at 162–63; Narro, supra note 
101, at 358.  
 108. GORDON, supra note 103, at 295–98. 
 109. Id. at 296 (suggesting the use of large numbers of individual claims to 
clog a legal system and show the need for change). 
 110. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 22. 
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that may have affected their ability to win the case.111
Finally, both educating and listening to workers are essen-
tial if representation in arbitration is to translate to active un-
ion membership. If the union is nothing more than a legal ser-
vice provider to the member, then the program will be nothing 
more than a lost opportunity for the union. 
 Employ-
ees can also help the union compile data to support legislative 
efforts to restrict unilaterally-imposed, unbalanced arbitration 
procedures. Whether the goal be eliminating compulsory arbi-
tration or requiring fair and balanced arbitration procedures, 
their stories can become a part of efforts to advocate for change. 
In this way, the union’s representation is used to build and sus-
tain a movement. 
2. NLRA Limitations on Moving to Majority Representation 
Because a major goal of the arbitration program is building 
membership, where possible, unions will want to increase 
membership in each workplace to become the majority repre-
sentative for the employees. At-large members will have what-
ever benefits the particular union chooses to provide but can-
not, at least under current law, compel the employer to 
negotiate with the union. Only when a majority of employees in 
an appropriate bargaining unit choose representation will the 
bargaining requirement attach, enabling the union to negotiate 
a collective bargaining agreement to protect the workers. Un-
ions interested in moving from one or more at-large members to 
majority representation must be aware that providing free rep-
resentation during the critical period between a petition for 
representation and an election may be grounds for setting aside 
an election won by the union.112 While the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had previously held that providing employees free 
legal services relating to employment concerns was not objec-
tionable,113 after a contrary opinion by the D.C. Circuit,114
 
 111. To the extent that the employees are no longer in the workplace, this 
task may be complicated. See supra note 
 the 
Board in 2011 in Stericycle decided that “a union ordinarily en-
gages in objectionable conduct warranting a second election by 
financing a lawsuit filed during the critical period, which states 
claims under Federal or State wage and hours laws or other 
similar employment law claims on behalf of employees in the 
95 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Stericycle, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (Aug. 23, 2011). 
 113. See Novotel New York, 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 637 (1996). 
 114. See Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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unit.”115 The rule was qualified, however, in a footnote, stating 
that where legal assistance was an existing benefit of union 
membership, not conditioned on joining the union before the 
election, providing such assistance only to members was not ob-
jectionable.116
The Stericycle rule does not provide a serious obstacle to 
the legal assistance benefit so long as it is provided to all union 
members regardless of the election. While none of the cases in-
volved the precise program advocated here, a benefit tied to 
membership that is available to employees who choose to join 
the union even without a majority organizing campaign would 
seem to pass muster under the existing rules, as it would be 
available to all members regardless of when they joined the un-
ion. To add extra insurance that the benefit would not invali-
date a pending election, the union could avoid filing any claim 
during the critical period, since the Board drew a bright line 
rule that permits legal representation in claims filed before the 
petition but finds objectionable claims filed during the critical 
period.
 
117 Because the median time between filing the petition 
and the election is thirty-eight days,118
3. Duty of Fair Representation or Other Potential Liability 
 avoiding filing during 
this time period would not pose a significant problem in most 
situations. Thus this program should not interfere with union 
efforts to convert at-large members to majority representation 
where support exists. 
An important question in determining whether to institute 
such a program is whether the risks for liability for the union 
outweigh any benefits from increased representation. In provid-
ing representation in arbitration outside collective bargaining, 
the union’s intent will be to offer the best possible representa-
tion. Anything less will not serve the interests of either the un-
ion or the workers. Nevertheless, some cases will be lost, some 
workers will be unhappy, and some may bring legal action 
 
 115. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61, at 4. 
 116. Id. at 4 n.15 (citing Dart Container, 277 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1985) (holding 
that leaflet telling employees that the membership benefit of free legal ser-
vices from the union would be available to employees in the event the union 
won the election was not objectionable because it merely advised employees of 
an existing union benefit)). 
 117. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61, at 3–4. 
 118. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 
(FISCAL YEAR 2012), MEMORANDUM GC 13-01 at 5 (2013), available at http:// 
www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-counsel-memos. 
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against the union. While setting realistic expectations regard-
ing the outcome of arbitration will help deal with this problem, 
it is important to consider what legal claims might be available 
to dissatisfied workers.  
When representing workers in arbitration under collective 
bargaining agreements, unions are governed by the duty of fair 
representation. The union’s representation cannot be arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith or the union will be liable to the 
employee for any losses attributable to the union’s conduct.119 
The duty of fair representation, however, arises from the right 
of exclusive representation.120 It is necessary to ensure the con-
stitutionality of the law, which deprives the employee of the 
right to negotiate directly with the employer and substitutes 
representation by the union.121 Thus, the purpose of the duty 
does not require its application when the union is offering rep-
resentation to employees who may choose instead to represent 
themselves because they are not a part of a majority bargaining 
unit. Representation is a benefit of union membership, but ac-
ceptance is not an obligation. The employee remains free, in the 
case of legal claims, to choose alternative representation. In-
deed, the same is true of legal claims even where the union is 
the majority representative unless the union has negotiated an 
exclusive forum for legal claims that bars the employee from 
choosing alternative representation.122
 
 119. See Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 223 (1983); Vaca v. 
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 195–96 (1967).  
 
 120. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Freeman v. Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no duty of fair represen-
tation requiring appeal of unfavorable grievance arbitration award because 
the “union does not serve as the exclusive agent for the members of the bar-
gaining unit with respect to [that] particular matter”); Dycus v. NLRB, 615 
F.2d 820, 826 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming NLRB’s finding that the duty does 
not apply to union’s withdrawal as representative since duty terminates with 
representation); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1028–31 
(N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding union owed no duty 
to former employees in settling wage claims with employer where they were no 
longer members of the bargaining unit and their interests conflicted with 
those of current employees); Lacy v. Local 287, UAW, 102 L.R.R.M. 2847, 2850 
(S.D. Ind. 1979) (finding union owed plaintiffs no duty with respect to filing 
claim for Trade Readjustment Assistance benefits), aff’d mem., 624 F.2d 1106 
(7th Cir. 1980); cf. Roberts v. W. Airlines, 425 F. Supp. 416, 430–31 (N.D. Cal. 
1976) (finding union had no legal duty to file lawsuit challenging state laws 
limiting employment of women); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 
1229 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (same), aff’d, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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Based on existing precedent and the rationale for the ap-
plication of the duty, it seems unlikely that the duty of fair rep-
resentation would apply to unions representing employees in 
arbitration where the employee remained free to choose other 
representation. Because none of the existing case law arose in 
an identical context, however, the answer is not certain. Most 
of the decided cases arose when the union failed to file legal 
claims, and many involve efforts by employees to evade the 
statute of limitations based on the union’s failure to file.123
If attorneys are used, ethical standards regarding repre-
sentation will apply, and malpractice claims will lie against the 
lawyers who fail in their duty. If union representatives are 
used,
 
Courts declined to find any duty on the part of the union to file 
a claim, absent any explicit promise to do so, when the employ-
ee was free to file his or her own claim. But in the program 
proposed here, where the union has voluntarily taken on repre-
sentation of the member in a legal case, some duty to the mem-
ber may apply. 
124 the duty of fair representation might be the most favor-
able standard for the union as it applies a relatively high bar 
for claims and provides the union a wide range of reasonable-
ness in its decisions.125 The wide range of reasonableness, how-
ever, is designed to provide the union the flexibility needed to 
represent all workers in the exclusive representation context. 
Representing an individual in a legal claim, particularly where 
there is no majority representation, does not implicate those 
concerns, with one possible exception. The union which repre-
sents the entire bargaining unit must make decisions about 
wise use of resources and may choose not to arbitrate certain 
contractual claims because of resource limitations.126
 
 123. See, e.g., Steffens v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 447 
(7th Cir. 1986); Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1316; Lacy, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2847. 
 The same 
concerns may apply to at-large union members.  
 124. The use of union representatives in these cases raises other issues dis-
cussed infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 69, 76–78 (1991). 
Generally employees have failed in their efforts to hold lay union representa-
tives to the standard of attorneys in handling cases in the contractual griev-
ance and arbitration procedure. See Ellyn Moscowitz & Victor J. Van Bourg, 
Carve-Outs and the Privatization of Workers’ Compensation in Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 52 (1995) (discussing cases). 
 126. There is some debate about whether this is a legitimate reason for de-
clining to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement. See generally 
Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee’s Rights Under the Collective 
  
2014] TRILOGY REDUX 1707 
 
Once the union commits to representation as a benefit of 
membership, however, it would seem committed to providing 
such representation on the terms offered. Failure to do so 
might well give rise to a legal claim against the union, perhaps 
in the form of breach of contract. In addition, negligent repre-
sentation by a union representative might also give rise to a 
common law claim of breach of a duty.127 While the union might 
argue that such a claim is preempted by the duty of fair repre-
sentation,128
4. Unauthorized Practice of Law 
 it is unclear whether the duty would have such 
force in the absence of exclusive representation. In either case, 
there is some risk of liability for unions instituting such a pro-
gram. While attorneys can protect against suits for malpractice 
with insurance, unions should consider the potential for liabil-
ity in using union representatives as a cost of the model. There 
is no reason that the risk of claims against the union would be 
any greater than the risk of duty of fair representation claims 
in the exclusive representation context, however. And finding a 
lawyer to sue the union would be even more challenging than 
finding a lawyer for arbitration in the first place. Thus, the risk 
should be factored into the cost, but should not dissuade unions 
from developing the program. Financing considerations will be 
contemplated further in Part IV. 
While unions commonly use union representatives in con-
tractual arbitration without consideration of the unauthorized 
practice of law, even where such claims might implicate or 
overlap with legal claims,129
 
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 
(1977). 
 the growth of arbitration of legal 
 127. Some courts have addressed the issue of what standard of care applies 
to provision of what might be characterized as legal services by non-lawyers. 
See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Stand-
ard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 97. The 
issue of the standard is intertwined with the question of what is the practice of 
law. Id. In some cases the courts find non-lawyers should be held to the stand-
ard of a lawyer. Id. Another approach is to apply a general negligence stand-
ard without explicitly defining the standard of care. Id. at 97–98. Other cases 
have declined to apply an attorney standard where a lay person is authorized 
to engage in representation in a legal forum. Id. at 99–100. 
 128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 129. In 2012, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to prevent non-
lawyer union representatives from representing the union in contractual labor 
arbitration based on the prohibition on unauthorized practice of law. See In re 
Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 86 (R.I. 2012). The court noted that some 
other states had explicitly allowed the practice, most had not addressed the 
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claims has given rise to concerns about unauthorized practice 
of law in the arbitral forum.130 While an employer’s program of 
arbitration may not limit representation to lawyers, this does 
not prevent the bar from intervening to protect consumers from 
unauthorized legal practice. The bar may be more concerned if 
the arbitration is being undertaken for compensation in the 
form of dues, as the program contemplates, as contrasted with 
representation by a friend, family member or coworker. Fur-
ther, an employer who fears that union representation in arbi-
tration may lead to unionization of the workforce may be moti-
vated to report such representation to the bar. If the duty of 
fair representation does not apply to protect the union member 
from union misconduct,131
There is no easy answer to the question of when unauthor-
ized practice of law occurs in arbitration. The issue could arise 
whether union representatives or out-of-state lawyers are in-
volved. The cases that would be covered by the proposed pro-
gram will largely involve legal claims. That they take place in 
the arbitral forum does not automatically place them outside 
the practice of law. Such determinations depend on the law of 
the state. One question will be whether the state has author-
ized representation by either nonlawyers or out-of-state law-
yers in arbitration.
 the bar may be even more concerned 
about protecting members from unauthorized practice of law. 
132 That in turn may depend on which state’s 
law applies.133 Some arbitrations may take place in a location 
other than where the dispute arose, and much of the prepara-
tion may take place in yet other jurisdictions.134 In some states, 
out-of-state attorneys may be able to do a few arbitrations per 
year without engaging in unauthorized practice or may be able 
to obtain admission pro hac vice for purposes of a particular 
case.135
 
issue, and none that the court or the parties could find had prohibited union 
representatives from arbitrating contractual claims. Id. at 90–91.  
  
 130. Kristen M. Blankley et al., Multijurisdictional ADR Practice: Lessons 
for Litigators, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 29–31 (2009); Buhai, supra 
note 127, at 125–26. 
 131. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text. 
 132. Blankley, supra note 130, at 32–33; Buhai, supra note 127, at 125–26. 
 133. Id. at 38–43. 
 134. Id. Workplace arbitrations are probably less likely to be scheduled in 
locations other than the employment site than others, as choosing an incon-
venient location may jeopardize the enforceability of the arbitration agree-
ment. 
 135. Blankley, supra note 130, at 43–54 (discussing a variety of state rules 
and their applicability). 
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Another question will be whether the arbitration actually 
involves the practice of law at all.136 If not, unauthorized prac-
tice is not an issue. The answer will depend in part upon the 
design of the arbitration system and the state law that ap-
plies.137 Many of the arbitration systems for nonunion employ-
ees have been structured to contain at least some of the ele-
ments of a judicial proceeding in order to avoid being set aside 
by a court on grounds that the agreement is unconscionable or 
the employee is unable to vindicate the statutory rights in the 
proceeding.138
In the many jurisdictions that have adopted ABA Model 
Rule 5.5(c)(3), the questions are easier to answer for attorneys; 
the rule authorizes licensed attorneys to practice law temporar-
ily in an ADR proceeding if their representation in the case is 
“reasonably related” to their practice in the jurisdiction where 
they are licensed.
 These elements may make it more likely that an 
arbitration is construed as the practice of law. 
139
These issues relating to unauthorized practice of law com-
plicate the creation of an arbitration program for legal claims, 
but provide ammunition for an advocacy campaign against the 
use of arbitration to deprive employees of their legal rights. 
Employees can be compelled by their employer to arbitrate le-
 For non-attorneys, however, or attorneys in 
other jurisdictions, the questions are more complex and require 
a careful evaluation of state law. 
 
 136. Id. at 31–37; Buhai, supra note 127, at 94.  
 137. Blankley, supra note 130, at 33–36 (discussing varying views on 
whether and when arbitration is the practice of law). While some states have 
not construed arbitration as the practice of law under the unauthorized prac-
tice of law limitations, these cases have involved attorneys not authorized to 
practice in the jurisdiction and not non-attorneys. See, e.g., Colmar, Ltd. v. 
Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1028 (2003) (recognizing that 
arbitration is more informal than a judicial proceeding, is chosen for the in-
formality which leads to quicker and cheaper resolution of disputes, is not re-
quired to follow the rules of evidence, and does not rely on legal precedent; re-
fusing to set aside an award because of the participation of an attorney not 
licensed in Illinois); Prudential Equity Grp. LLC v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d 
605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same). 
 138. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (finding on due process grounds that a predispute arbitration agreement 
is enforceable only when it provides for neutral arbitrators, more than mini-
mal discovery, a written award, all types of relief available in court, and does 
not force the employee to pay unreasonable costs or arbitrators’ fees); 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 
2000) (reaching the same result on unconscionability grounds).  
 139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3) (2013). Twenty-
nine states have adopted this provision although six have modified the rule in 
ways that may alter its application. Blankley, supra note 130, at 47. 
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gal claims in a less hospitable forum, deprived of the ability to 
bring such claims as a class, and then deprived of representa-
tion because attorneys are uninterested or unaffordable and 
non-attorneys are ineligible due to bar rules. The reason that 
non-lawyers have been permitted to practice law in some areas 
is a tacit recognition that poor and middle-class Americans 
have been deprived of access to legal services due to cost.140
These issues relating to the unauthorized practice of law 
must be taken into account in determining the financing of the 
system and the model to be chosen, and it is to those two sub-
jects that the Article turns next. 
 Ef-
forts to restrict union representation of workers in arbitration 
can become part of the campaign to combat unilaterally-
imposed arbitration and provide a fair and neutral forum for 
workplace disputes. 
III.  STRUCTURING AN EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE 
PROGRAM   
A. FINANCING THE PROGRAM 
Perhaps the most difficult issue is how to finance such a 
program. Representation can be costly and the demand is 
somewhat unpredictable. The program would backfire as a tool 
for increasing union membership if the need for representation 
outstripped the ability to provide it effectively. Thus the pro-
gram must be structured in a way that makes financing feasi-
ble. While the program might vary based on the particular un-
ion, this section will set forth some programmatic options 
relating to finances.141
 
 140. Buhai, supra note 
 The following section, which discusses 
how to provide the representation, will also affect the financial 
viability of the program. 
127, at 93–94. Although some representation is 
permitted but not expressly authorized, the Social Security Act explicitly al-
lows non-attorney representation in claims before the agency and provides for 
compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (2006).  
 141. Some scholars have suggested that new ways of aggregating claims in 
arbitration might arise and that there might even be a market for lawyers or 
non-lawyers to purchase small claims. See Myriam E. Gilles & Anthony J. 
Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 392, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263443. Unions might 
play a role in creating new ways of financing and litigating arbitration claims 
of employees.  
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1. Eligibility for Assistance 
Since a major purpose of the program is to increase union 
membership, the benefit should be offered to union members 
only. Unions should consider whether to require a waiting peri-
od after joining for eligibility for representation. A waiting pe-
riod would prevent individuals from joining only when they 
need representation and thus increasing costs. If most mem-
bers need representation, there will an insufficient number of 
members who do not use the benefit to subsidize the cost of 
representation. On the other hand, the recruiting appeal for 
representation may be less attractive to those who cannot fore-
see using the benefit. And long delays in seeing benefits from 
the program may cause employees to cease membership. It will 
be important to publicize victorious cases to members and po-
tential members so that they see the value of obtaining and re-
taining membership. 
2. Scope of Assistance 
The program will also need to define the scope of legal as-
sistance available. The union needs to create a program with 
the correct balance to ensure that costs to the union are not ex-
cessive while still providing a valuable service to members. To 
some extent, the scope of representation will depend on antici-
pated utilization and the model of representation chosen. The 
proposed model is to offer representation in arbitration, includ-
ing any procedures preceding arbitration. An alternative would 
be to offer representation in any legal dispute relating to em-
ployment regardless of forum.  
Limiting the program to arbitration reduces the population 
of employees who can be effectively recruited using this benefit. 
The arbitration-only option would apply primarily to newly re-
cruited at-large members, as most existing members will not 
have an arbitration program for claims other than those under 
the collective bargaining agreement, unless the union has cho-
sen to negotiate such a program. This would reduce the cost of 
the program. A program offering representation for all work-
place legal claims regardless of forum will be substantially 
more expensive as existing members would likely take ad-
vantage of the option as well.142
 
 142. Of course, some unions already provide representation for members in 
cases involving claims under laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
the various discrimination laws. Another option is to offer a broader legal ser-
vices plan that also covers common claims not directly related to employment 
 Additionally, the union must 
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have attorneys available for cases litigated in the judicial fo-
rum.143
An arbitration-only program has the advantage of being 
part of a larger political and social justice campaign to fight 
back against employers who are limiting employee and con-
sumer rights using binding arbitration agreements. Such a 
campaign would align unions with plaintiffs’ employment at-
torneys and other groups, such as Public Citizen, who are 
fighting the arbitration battle.
 Alternatively, the program could cover all arbitration, 
including consumer arbitration, which would expand the bene-
fit in ways that would aid existing members, but would also 
challenge existing union expertise. 
144
Limiting representation to arbitration will likely be cheap-
er for the union because it is likely to involve only one hearing 
with very limited availability of any appeal. Moreover, the 
speed of the process will avoid tying up the representatives for 
long periods of time. If the employer’s ADR program includes 
 As noted above, it also broad-
ens the goals of the program beyond winning a particular case, 
which increases the utility of the program as an effective re-
cruitment and retention device.  
 
such as real estate closings, divorces, and immigration issues. Some unions 
have a history of offering such plans. See, e.g., Affordable Access to Justice, 
UAW LEGAL SERVS. PLAN, http://www.uawlsp.com/default.asp (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2014). Unions have more general plans as well. See Legal Help for Un-
ion Families, UNION PLUS, http://www.unionplus.org/legal-aid-services (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2014) (offering legal assistance to members and retirees of par-
ticipating unions). As noted above, the more claims that are covered, the more 
costly the benefit as more people are likely to use it. In addition, while there 
are opportunities to recover legal fees from the defendant in many successful 
employment cases, thus reducing the cost of representation, in other areas of 
law, such as real estate and immigration, no fee recovery is available. On the 
other hand the costs of representation will be quite low for some cases, such as 
simple real estate transactions. This type of plan, however, is less likely to 
serve the purpose of engaging employees in the broader union movement and 
more likely to draw and retain only those who see the union as a competitive 
service provider. Any type of legal services plan that requires practice in court 
will require use of counsel authorized to practice in the jurisdiction, potential-
ly increasing costs. 
 143. Depending on the state and its interpretation of unauthorized practice 
of law, there may be limitations on the use of non-lawyers in arbitration as 
well. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Advocacy: Forced Arbitration, NELA, https://www.nela.org/NELA/ 
index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=mandarbitration (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); 
Fair Arbitration, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2512 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). The Arbitration Fairness Act has been regularly in-
troduced in Congress. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. 
(2013). It would eliminate compulsory arbitration imposed on employees and 
consumers by businesses.  
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earlier steps, the case may settle in those stages, reducing the 
costs. Litigation, however, might take years, involving exten-
sive pretrial discovery and appeals, as well as pretrial motions 
with accompanying briefs. 
To reduce the cost of the program (and also the benefit), 
the union could limit claims to certain legal violations. For ex-
ample, claims relating to unpaid wages under state and federal 
law are likely to be difficult for employees to pursue in individ-
ual arbitration, where the cost might exceed the amount of the 
recovery.145 These claims may be less complex to arbitrate than 
discrimination claims, for example, and easier to standardize 
once a few successful claims have been brought.146 Without po-
tential for class actions, these claims may be far less attractive 
to the plaintiffs’ bar.147
Another question is whether some judgment will be made 
as to the prospects for success before the union undertakes rep-
resentation. Including such a requirement is essential to pre-
 The union could provide a real service to 
employees, tying into the theme of challenging employers who 
try to take away employee rights using arbitration. The down-
side to this limitation is that it makes the benefit less attrac-
tive than one that covers a broader range of workplace dis-
putes. Discrimination, wrongful terminations under state tort 
and contract law, and violations of the Family Medical Leave 
Act are common claims that also cry out for legal representa-
tion. 
 
 145. See Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. Civ. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002 
WL 100391, at *6, rev’d, 346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that given the 
small size of each plaintiff’s overtime claim, many were likely to abandon 
those claims without availability of a class action). 
 146. Recent research on a set of employment arbitrations before the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association demonstrated that discrimination claims were 
more difficult to win in employer-promulgated procedures than other cases, 
but led to higher damage awards in those cases won. Colvin & Pike, supra 
note 52, at 28. 
 147. Other Court decisions have made it easier to defeat class and collec-
tive actions also. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 
1523 (2013) (finding employer’s offer of complete individual relief under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 68 mooted collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (applying high stand-
ard for commonality of claims warranting class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23); see also Christopher McKinney, Corporate Attorneys Planning Strategies 
to “Pick Off” FLSA Collective Actions, TEX. EMP. L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.texasemploymentlawblog.com/2013/04/articles/trial-practice 
-litigation-issu/corporate-attorneys-planning-strategies-to-pick-off-flsa 
-collective-actions (describing business strategies for defeating FLSA collective 
actions in light of Genesis Healthcare and pointing out that these cases could 
become so difficult that plaintiffs’ lawyers will decline to accept them).  
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serve resources for cases in which there is a viable claim. The 
union must decide who will make the determination of viability 
and what standard will be used. Further, the standards for the 
determination must be clear to the members to avoid unhappi-
ness and legal action when denials occur. Certainly the union 
should be able to decline representation in cases where there is 
no viable legal claim, and strong claims pose no real issue, but 
there are many arguable claims where success is uncertain. At 
a minimum, the decisions must involve assessment by a lawyer 
and include an explanation to the member of the reasons for 
the decision.  
The more claims that are covered, the more valuable the 
benefit is to the employees but the more costly the benefit is to 
the union. Where the arbitration plan is so tilted against em-
ployees that success is unlikely, the union must decide whether 
to decline representation or challenge the plan in court. Such 
litigation will be expensive, but may offer the potential for re-
covery of legal fees and if successful will benefit all of the em-
ployees in the workplace. Further, as noted above, even a loss 
in such cases can be fuel for the fire of both membership re-
cruitment and arbitration reform. Nevertheless, without some 
victories in arbitration the program is likely to be both unpopu-
lar and unsuccessful. 
Another consideration is whether the union will cover all 
costs of representation or impose some limits either in maxi-
mum monetary terms or in terms of services covered.148 For ex-
ample, if the employee is responsible for part of the cost of the 
arbitrator it should be clear whether the union pays that, as 
well as other costs of litigation such as discovery. In addition, 
the program must be clear on whether the union provides rep-
resentation for appeals of unfavorable decisions. Given the lim-
ited grounds for appeal of arbitration,149
 
 148. Additionally, where the employer’s program offers the employee funds 
to pay a lawyer, the program should require the employee to access those 
funds and pay them to the attorney, defraying part of the cost of representa-
tion. See infra note 
 the union should cer-
tainly retain the right to decide not to fund an appeal unless 
prospects for success are substantial. That limitation and the 
reasons for it should be clear to members and used to bolster 
the campaign to limit or reform compulsory arbitration. Deci-
158.  
 149. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2012); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 585–86 (2008) (finding FAA’s grounds for review exclusive).150.Of course, 
depending on the scope of the plan or pilot program, existing members may 
utilize the plan immediately. 
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sions about the scope of representation must be carefully con-
sidered, as they will impact both the costs and benefits of the 
plan.  
3. Marketing and Rollout of the Plan 
To some extent, the costs of the plan will depend on how 
and to whom it is marketed. To avoid being overwhelmed with 
more claims than the system can handle,150 the program could 
initially be marketed or tested in a limited way, perhaps to em-
ployees in industries where the union already represents some 
employees, or to those where at least some employees have 
shown interest in union membership. Alternatively it could be 
piloted in a particular geographic area where the union has 
available local representatives who can handle the claims.151
4. Union Membership Dues 
 
Limiting the geographic area facilitates compliance with bar 
requirements regarding unauthorized practice of law and fee 
sharing. Additionally, a slow roll-out will give the union the op-
portunity to test the program and work out any kinks before a 
wholesale campaign. 
Unions already have set membership dues for existing and 
prospective members. AFL-CIO unions have just voted to adopt 
new forms of representation with new dues structures and/or 
other financing mechanisms.152
Since this benefit is designed as a tool to recruit new mem-
bers who are not a part of a collective bargaining unit, a union 
that does not currently have at-large or affiliate members will 
need to determine whether to charge the same dues to those 
members or a different amount based on the availability of 
benefits and the cost of representation. Even those that cur-
 As a benefit of membership, 
representation could be covered by dues payments or subject to 
an additional charge, calculated by the union. Depending on 
the scope of the benefit, some dues increase or additional 
charge may be necessary.  
 
 150. Of course, depending on the scope of the plan or pilot program, exist-
ing members may utilize the plan immediately. 
 151. Recent research by Colvin & Pike demonstrated that arbitration cases 
in California were more likely to be successful and to achieve a higher damage 
award for the employee. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 28–29. This may 
suggest that California is a good place to begin the program although it also 
indicates that Californians may not need the program as much as employees 
in other states.  
 152. Amber, supra note 6. 
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rently have such members may need to reconsider the dues 
structure in light of this added benefit.153 Working America, the 
AFL-CIO’s affiliate for members in units not represented for 
collective bargaining, is currently considering a dues structure 
based on services and benefits provided, which might provide 
an opportunity to test this idea.154
B. PROVIDING REPRESENTATION 
 A key factor in cost will be 
the model of representation used, and it is to that factor that 
the Article turns next. 
There are a variety of possible models for providing repre-
sentation in legal disputes. Careful evaluation will be neces-
sary to determine the best model for each union. This section is 
not designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of all possible 
issues, but to highlight some of the available models for consid-
eration and suggest some of the benefits and concerns that 
might arise with each.  
Unions arbitrating collective bargaining disputes use var-
ied representation models. Some regularly use attorneys for ar-
bitration, either in-house lawyers or attorneys from law firms, 
while others rarely use attorneys, preferring to utilize union 
representatives in arbitration cases. Cost and complexity of the 
case are certainly factors in making this determination. As for 
the legal arbitrations contemplated, depending on the scope of 
cases, some may require attorneys for effective representation 
because of the legal complexity while others might easily be ar-
bitrated by trained union representatives. In addition, ques-
tions of unauthorized practice of law must weigh heavily in this 
determination.155
 
 153. For example, the United Steelworkers currently have an associate 
membership, which apparently is free and designed to facilitate communica-
tion, community, and political action and organizing. See About the Associate 
Members Program, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/join_us/about 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 Whatever model is chosen, it should be clear 
up front to the members who will represent them or, if the plan 
uses both attorneys and union representatives, who will decide 
which representatives handle which cases. The sections that 
follow discuss the considerations in deciding which representa-
tional model to follow. 
 154. Amber, supra note 6. 
 155. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text. 
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1. Attorneys 
These are legal disputes and the immediate instinct is to 
use lawyers to try them, regardless of forum. Lawyers are 
trained to handle legal disputes. Their training and experience 
enables them to see the nuances of cases that may be missed by 
lay representatives. There are clear rules that apply to all at-
torneys and govern their representation of clients.156
a. In House Attorneys 
 The avail-
ability of malpractice insurance to guard against claims by dis-
satisfied clients is another benefit of using lawyers. Unions 
typically have attorneys on staff and frequently also use out-
side counsel. Either could be utilized to handle legal claims of 
members. Important considerations in deciding between them 
are cost to the union, availability of attorneys authorized to ar-
bitrate in the relevant jurisdictions, and the application of ethi-
cal rules regarding representation and legal fees.  
Virtually every existing national union has a staff of attor-
neys that handles a variety of legal matters for the union. Some 
local unions employ staff attorneys as well. It is well-settled 
that the union can employ attorneys to assist members with le-
gal claims without running afoul of state bar requirements.157
 i. Financial Considerations 
 
The union might use its own staff attorneys or set up a sepa-
rate legal plan with attorneys employed specifically to aid 
workers in their legal disputes with employers. 
A significant benefit of using staff attorneys is cost.158
 
 156. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). 
 Pay-
ing attorneys a salary is likely to be more cost-effective than 
 157. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Assoc., 389 
U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 
(1963) (finding constitutional right to assist members and others with litiga-
tion using NAACP staff attorneys paid by the organization). 
 158. Some employers provide funds to employees to assist in obtaining le-
gal representation. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 62; see also COOPER, 
NOLAN, BALES, & BEFORT supra note 76, at 825 (quoting an employer’s coun-
sel who suggests that employers should, if necessary, pay for the employee’s 
lawyer because it makes the process easier for both parties and provides the 
employee with both a realistic view of the prospects for success and advice 
about the fairness of any settlement). The union’s program should make clear 
that members are expected to take advantage of any funds provided by the 
employer and use them to pay for representation. It is highly unlikely that 
such fees will cover the entire cost of representation, but they will alleviate 
some expense. Where such programs exist to convince employees to join the 
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paying outside counsel to litigate. In today’s tight job market 
for lawyers, hiring qualified attorneys interested in workers’ 
rights and willing to work for a union representing workers 
with legal claims should not be difficult. However, hiring staff 
does come with the added costs of the benefits the union pro-
vides and associated employment costs, such as workers’ com-
pensation and unemployment insurance. Geographic considera-
tions may also be relevant. It may be more cost-effective to use 
outside counsel in locations requiring significant travel costs 
for union staff lawyers. Additionally, the union must consider 
whether the staff attorneys will be able to arbitrate in the rele-
vant jurisdictions. Thus, the union must determine whether it 
is more economical to hire attorneys or contract with outside 
counsel, which will depend on many factors and might change 
over time. 
Even where the union’s attorney is salaried, if the legal 
claim results in a remedial award of attorneys’ fees, those fees 
can be awarded at market rates so long as they go into a litiga-
tion fund and not into the union’s general fund.159 To avoid eth-
ical concerns about fee splitting arrangements with 
nonlawyers, the fund should be controlled by attorneys and 
used to support only legal actions, not other union functions.160
 
union for the benefit of representation, the union must be prepared to show 
the inadequacy of employer funds for obtaining effective representation. Addi-
tionally, using employer funds to pay union-provided attorneys raises the 
question of whether payment of those funds to the union or the employee 
would violate § 302 of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012). Because the 
payment is to the employee, and not to the union directly, it would seem to 
implicate only § 302(3), which prohibits payment to employees to influence 
other employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Id. § 186(a)(3). Since that is 
not the purpose, § 302 should not bar the use of the fees to pay union lawyers, 
so long as the fees go towards legal representation, and not the general treas-
ury. See infra note 
 
159 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., Raney v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 222 F.3d 927, 939 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); Kean v. Stone, 966 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1992); Curran v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 805 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 901–02 (1984) (allowing full recovery of market rate fees to nonprofit 
legal services organization, even though the attorney was salaried and had no 
billing rate). There is, however, no guarantee that an arbitrator will award 
fees using the same standards as a court would. And, indeed, some arbitration 
programs limit remedies, including fees. See Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 
110 F.3d 222, 225, 230–31 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 160. Raney, 222 F.3d at 936–37; Rodriguez v. City of New York, 721 F. 
Supp. 2d 148, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). While some bars have eliminated the ban 
on fee sharing with nonprofit organizations as have the ABA Model Rules, 
other states retain limitations on fee sharing with nonlawyers. For examples 
of rules that permit fee sharing with nonprofit organizations, see MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4) (2002); see also Va. Legal Ethics 
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With these limited restrictions, however, attorneys’ fees awards 
from successful cases can assist in funding representation for 
other union members with legal claims. 
 ii. Ethical Issues Regarding Representation 
The concern that animates the prohibition on fee sharing 
also applies in general to the employment of attorneys by the 
union, controlled by non-attorneys, to represent members. The 
fear is that the attorney will be influenced by something other 
than solely the needs of the client. In approving the use of un-
ion attorneys to represent members in United Mine Workers, 
the Supreme Court characterized the possibility of conflicting 
interests between the union and employees as “theoretically 
imaginable,” but found it to be no justification for barring union 
legal assistance to members.161 To insure protection of the in-
terests of members and to avoid any issue with the bar, the 
program should provide for complete independence on the part 
of the lawyers making decisions regarding clients’ cases. It 
should require attorney compliance with all ethical rules and in 
particular, dedication to the interests of the union mem-
ber/client.162 Ideally, designated attorneys should handle the 
members’ cases exclusively, while others handle the union’s le-
gal business. Such separation will protect the interests of the 
union, the members, and the attorneys.163
 
Comm., Op. 1744 (2000), available at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1744.htm; 
Am. Bar Ass’n, Ala. Formal and Informal Ethics Op. RO-95-08 (1995), availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/ 
Iris/clearinghouse/opinion2.authcheckdam.pdf. For examples of rules prohibit-
ing fee sharing with nonprofit organizations, see R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory 
Panel, Op. 2000-05 (2000) [hereinafter R.I. Ethics Op.], available at http:// 
www.courts.ri.gov/AttorneyResources/ethicsadvisorypanel/Opinions/2000-5 
.pdf; Mass. Bar Assoc., Ethics Op. 97-6 (1997), available at https://www 
.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1997/opinion-no-97-6; 
Tex. Ctr. for Legal Ethics, Op. 503 (1994), available at http://www.legalethics 
texas.com/Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-503.aspx. 
 Using a separate le-
 161. 389 U.S. at 224. 
 162. The union lawyer’s ethical obligations are complex when representing 
members in the negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure. See generally 
Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer’s Obligations to Bargaining Unit Mem-
bers: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Substantive 
Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1996) (discussing the complexities involved for 
union lawyers who represent the union as an organization and union members 
and potential members). Some of the challenges should be less difficult when 
dealing with legal claims. 
 163. See generally, Pearce, supra note 162 (discussing the complexity of a 
union lawyer’s ethical obligations). 
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gal plan which employs the attorneys but is funded by the un-
ion might further emphasize the distinction. 
b. Outsourcing Representation 
An alternative method for providing the legal services to 
members is to outsource the representation to private attor-
neys. Most unions use outside counsel for some legal services 
and thus have relationships with private attorneys who special-
ize in labor and employment issues. Additionally, attorneys 
who specialize in representing employees may be interested in 
handling these cases if payment were more certain than in a 
contingent case involving an individual employee in arbitra-
tion.164 The U.S. Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar165
 i. Costs, Fees, and Ethical Limitations 
 held that union referral of 
members to outside counsel for representation is permissible 
and protected First Amendment activity. 
Use of outside counsel may be more expensive than hiring 
staff attorneys. Outside counsel are typically compensated on 
an hourly basis, although the union could negotiate favorable 
rates, particularly in today’s legal market. Attorneys must 
make sufficient income to support their practices, which ex-
plains the general lack of interest in many of these cases. Nego-
tiation might produce a favorable fee agreement beneficial to 
both the union and the attorneys, however. A creative ar-
rangement might reduce the costs to the union to comparable 
to or less than the cost of in-house lawyers. 
As one example, a nonprofit group representing day labor-
ers paid an attorney a $10,000 retainer to represent the day la-
borers in their workers’ compensation claims.166 The organiza-
tion allowed the attorney to keep 10% of the recovery for each 
claim and to pay back the organization with the first $10,000 
collected through this process.167 The remainder of the fees be-
longed to the attorney.168
 
 164. See supra note 
 The bar approved the arrangement, 
67 and accompanying text (noting that employees with 
smaller claims often have trouble finding a lawyer to take their case because 
the size of the potential recovery is so small). 
 165. 377 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 166. D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 329 (2005), available at http://www.dcbar.org/ 
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion329.cfm. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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noting that because the payment to the nonprofit was not con-
tingent on the amount of the recovery and because of the non-
profit’s purpose, there was little likelihood that the nonprofit 
would interfere with the attorney’s professional judgment.169 
Additionally, allowing the practice would further the purpose of 
making legal services more available to underserved popula-
tions.170
Recovery of fees in excess of those paid out to the lawyer of-
fers a way for the union to finance other litigation on behalf of 
employees. In the case of staff attorneys, the ability to obtain 
market rate fees offers that opportunity. With outside counsel, 
such recovery is less likely unless the union can negotiate to 
pay less than market rates and obtain a fee award of market 
rates or more.
 In such an arrangement, the union can predict its 
costs. However, it does not then benefit from all of the fees 
awarded in successful cases where defendants pay fees. 
171
The concern of the bar that differentiates outside counsel 
referrals from in-house attorney cases is that cases might be re-
ferred to counsel who promise the greatest “referral fee” to the 
referring organization.
 Contentious litigation over the fee award will 
raise the costs of the case. And fee awards shared with the un-
ion by outside counsel may raise more questions with the bar 
than those by in-house attorneys. 
172
 
 169. Id. 
 Many bars have recognized that these 
concerns are not present when the referring organization is a 
nonprofit with a goal of increasing access to legal representa-
 170. Id. 
 171. The arbitrator would have to be convinced that the market rate ex-
ceeded the rate the attorney charged. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 
(1984) (“[courts] must avoid . . . decreasing reasonable fees because the attor-
neys conducted the litigation more as an act of pro bono publico than as an ef-
fort at securing a large monetary return.” (quoting Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 
64 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Cal., 1974)); Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth. 457 
F.3d 224, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the magistrate judge had erred 
in granting fees at negotiated discount rate instead of market rate); St. Louis 
Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of St. Louis, 96 F.3d 323, 332 n.9 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that the fee agreed to may indicate what is reasonable and should be 
considered, but it is not dispositive for determining fee award). In some cases 
attorneys’ fees may include an adjustment either up or down based on factors 
such as success in the case or, in rare cases, quality of representation. See 2 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 42-70 to 42-79 (Barbara T. Lindemann et 
al. eds., 2012).  
 172. See R.I. Ethics Op., supra note 160 (noting that fee-splitting could 
cause a lay-person to hire the lawyer who offers the best referral fee, rather 
than the most competent lawyer).  
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tion.173 Others, however, have applied the prohibition on fee 
sharing even to nonprofits,174 some recognizing the inapplicabil-
ity of the concern but feeling bound by the language of the 
rule.175 The concern seems even less relevant if the union is on-
ly receiving compensation for fees paid to the lawyer. Further, 
building on United Mine Workers and Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen, the union may have a First Amendment argument 
to challenge the bar requirements.176
To maximize the chances of fee recovery and to minimize 
any ethical concerns, the union’s agreements with outside 
counsel should ensure the independence of the lawyers in rep-
resenting the employees. Additionally, any fees recovered by 
the union should be segregated in a legal expense fund sepa-
rate from the general treasury. Fee arrangements could be tai-
lored to the requirements of the bar in the particular state. At-
torneys may be reluctant to risk bar sanctions even if there are 
constitutional or other arguments available to challenge the 
bar. Alternatively, the union could seek a legal ethics opinion 
from the bar specific to the circumstances of the program. 
 Nevertheless, in creating 
such a program unions must be aware that in some states re-
covery of legal fees may be impossible, at least without litiga-
tion. 
c. Legal Services Plan 
An alternative that may alleviate some bar concerns is to 
set up a legal services plan as a separate organization that em-
ploys or retains counsel. If the organization is operated by an 
attorney or attorneys who control the decisions, concerns about 
fee sharing or unauthorized practice of law will be mini-
mized.177
 
 173. See, e.g., supra note 
 For a union with an existing legal services plan, inclu-
160 and accompanying text. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See R.I. Ethics Op., supra note 160, at 2–3. 
 176. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 906 (2012), available at http:// 
www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=4222 (citing Roy D. Simon, 
Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J. 
1069, 1126–32 (1989)). 
 177. See id. (indicating that decisions banning fee sharing do not address 
the situation where the nonprofit is itself a law firm). As for unauthorized 
practice of law, although some bars have raised concerns about attorneys 
working for nonprofits run by non-lawyers, see Wayne Moore, Are Organiza-
tions That Provide Free Legal Services Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice 
of Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2397, 2400 (1999). United Mine Workers seems 
to have put those concerns at rest for unions. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. 
Ill. State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
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sion of the arbitration services in the plan will entail minimal 
administrative cost. Setting up such a plan, however, will in-
volve administrative costs which must be taken into account in 
determining the best structure.  
The union could create a legal services plan in partnership 
with other organizations such as worker centers or existing le-
gal aid programs in the area.178 One advantage of creating a 
separate organization is that, consistent with existing legal re-
quirements, it might be established as an organization that 
would entitle attorneys working for the organization to loan 
forgiveness after ten years of employment in qualifying organi-
zations.179 Unions do not qualify, but a separate organization 
funded in part by the union and created in partnership with ex-
isting service providers to low income populations, if carefully 
structured, could meet the requirements.180
2. Using Union Representatives 
 If so, the organiza-
tion could attract young lawyers who would be willing to work 
for lower pay because of the loan forgiveness attached to em-
ployment. A cheaper alternative to using lawyers, however, 
would be to employ union representatives in arbitration.  
The use of union representatives in place of attorneys could 
reduce the arbitration costs to the union even further. In many 
unions, union representatives are trained to arbitrate cases 
and regularly do so.181 In most cases, however, the claims are 
contractual rather than legal,182
 
 178. Unions are already partnering with worker centers on various initia-
tives, and the AFL-CIO recently adopted a resolution, backed by organization-
al resources, to increase partnerships with community organizations dedicated 
to social and economic justice, including worker centers. Resolution 16: Build-
ing Enduring Labor-Community Partnerships, AFL-CIO 2013 CONVENTION, 
http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/Conventions/2013/Resolutions-and 
-Amendments/Resolution-16-Building-Enduring-Labor-Community 
-Partnerships (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 although there is occasional 
overlap. Accordingly, additional training may be necessary to 
enable union representatives without legal backgrounds to 
 179. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FED. 
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/ 
charts/public-service#what-kinds-of-employment (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 180. See id. (noting that employment with a public organization that pro-
vides public interest legal services may qualify for the loan forgiveness pro-
gram). 
 181. See In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 90–91 (R.I. 2012) (dis-
cussing the use of union representatives in arbitration cases). 
 182. See id. at 93 (noting that the labor disputes often involve “the law of 
the shop” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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handle these claims. And some cases may be too legally com-
plex to be handled by a union representative. As noted above, 
however, in some instances, once a few cases have been arbi-
trated, similar cases could easily be tried following the pat-
tern.183 For example, if many employees have been required to 
work off the clock under similar circumstances, it would be rel-
atively easy for a union representative to try such cases based 
on a litigation pattern. The legal questions as to whether pay-
ment is due are relatively straightforward, and the cases will 
turn mostly on the facts.184
The most significant question about using union repre-
sentatives is whether they would be engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law.
 
185 There appears to be a significant risk in 
many states that arbitrating legal claims might be deemed the 
unauthorized practice of law, even if the employer’s arbitral 
system contemplates nonlegal representation.186
A less risky model would use union representatives like 
paralegals, engaging them in investigation and case prepara-
tion under the supervision of lawyers, in addition to involving 
them in earlier steps in the ADR process. Their substantial ex-
perience in arbitration would fit them well for such tasks and 
reduce the attorney time invested. If the union representatives 
acted as paralegals, recovery of fees for their time might be 
available if fees are awarded as a remedy.
 The union 
must consider the risk of legal liability should it undertake 
such a model. While the union might be able to insure against 
duty of fair representation claims and perhaps other legal 
claims of negligent representation if such representation is in 
compliance with law, unauthorized law practice would most 
likely negate any insurance. 
187
 
 183. See supra Part II.A.3 (identifying the susceptibility of certain wage 
and hour disputes to this kind of system). 
 Because most em-
 184. The employee would need to prove that she worked overtime without 
pay and show the amount of time worked, in addition to showing that the em-
ployer had actual or constructive knowledge that the employee was working 
overtime. E.g., Davis v. Food Lion, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986). Even 
where there is some complex aspect to the litigation, such as the use of an ex-
pert in the Food Lion case to show that Food Lion’s system effectively required 
off the clock work, id. at 1277, a lawyer could try the first individual case but 
all subsequent cases should be able to be systematized.  
 185. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 186. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text. 
 187. Recovery for paralegal time is permissible if documentation is availa-
ble to support the time expended and the tasks are appropriate for a paralegal 
and not tasks that could be completed by a staff member without such qualifi-
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ployment statutes refer explicitly to remedial awards of attor-
neys’ fees, it is unclear whether recovery of fees for a nonlegal 
representative acting in place of a lawyer would be available, 
however.188
3. Employee Self-Representation 
  
Another alternative would be to train employees for self-
representation. This model could be used in cases with a multi-
tude of similar claims that would otherwise be litigated as a 
class.189 It would work most effectively in cases with relatively 
simple legal issues. Self-representation avoids the problem of 
unauthorized practice of law.190 It also empowers employees 
and involves them directly in their own cases, which may de-
crease the chance that they see the union only as a service pro-
vider and increase the chance that they stay involved with the 
union after the conclusion of the case.191
 
cations, for example, clerical work. See, e.g., Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, 175 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the relevant inquiry for 
determining hours worked by paralegals is “whether the work was sufficiently 
complex to justify the efforts of a paralegal, as opposed to an employee at the 
next rung lower on the pay-scale ladder” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing that fees for paralegal services are recoverable and should be determined 
in the same manner as those for lawyers). 
 The cost to the union 
should be lower, although it is possible that an attorney might 
litigate simple cases in less time than it takes to train members 
 188. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (“The 
court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and 
costs of the action.”); Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (2012) 
(“The court in such an action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to 
the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable expert witness fees, 
and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant.”); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(k) (2006) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Com-
mission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fee) 
as part of the costs . . . .”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 
(2006) (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to 
this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including liti-
gation expenses, and costs . . . .”). 
 189. This model may be especially useful given the limits imposed by the 
Supreme Court on the use of class action litigation. See supra Part I.B. 
 190. See Unauthorized Practice of Law, S.C. BAR, http://www.scbar.org/ 
PublicServices/UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (ex-
cepting self-representation from the general definition of unauthorized prac-
tice of law). 
 191. See supra Part II.B.I. 
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to be self-advocates, particularly if there are a small number of 
members involved. 
One risk is that employees will see this as an abandonment 
of the promise of representation, resulting in dissatisfaction 
and perhaps even litigation. Thus it should be done only with 
clear notice to members that this is possible in some cases or 
with the agreement of the member(s) that it is an effective ap-
proach in the particular case. 
4. Hybrid Model 
Given all of the considerations outlined above, the best 
model for representation is one that is flexible. A flexible model 
enables the union to respond to the specific needs in the partic-
ular case by considering the members involved, the particular 
jurisdiction’s limits on representation, the availability of repre-
sentatives that meet the necessary criteria, and the costs and 
potential fee recoveries. A hybrid entails administrative costs, 
since a determination must be made as to what resources to al-
locate to each case. It necessitates standards for the determina-
tion that are clear to both the administrators and the members 
who are entitled to representation. Clear standards minimize 
the likelihood of member disappointment, which could under-
mine the value of the system, and also of legal liability for fail-
ure to represent or effectively represent as promised. Involve-
ment of representative members in creating and administering 
such standards would be ideal, although might be difficult in 
larger organizations. Such a system would enable the most ef-
fective deployment of union resources and, one hopes, lead to 
the best chances of success on the claims and incorporation of 
members in an advocacy campaign to enhance workplace jus-
tice.   
  CONCLUSION   
Erosion of worker’s rights is proceeding at an accelerating 
pace. Unions, while declining in strength and influence, remain 
the most powerful workers’ rights organizations in the United 
States. Unions have an opportunity to both build their mem-
bership and advocate for greater protection for the legal rights 
of workers by creating an arbitration advocacy program. While 
elimination of unilaterally-imposed employer arbitration would 
be ideal, it seems unlikely in the current climate. Given that, 
union advocacy can challenge employer-created arbitration 
programs by providing employee representation to balance em-
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ployer power and by mobilizing workers to combat such pro-
grams through public protest and legislative advocacy. While 
there are challenges in establishing a cost-effective program, 
creative union efforts can meet them, turning an employer tac-
tic used to reduce enforcement of the law to their advantage. 
Unions must seize every possible opportunity to improve the 
lives of workers and rebuild a powerful and successful move-
ment to balance corporate power. 
 
 
